reduce their weapons arsenals, 9 and become less involved in maintaining stability along the former Cold War front, other countries are increasing their efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a means of self defense." As countries scrambled to fill the vacuum of military power, heretofore comatose antagonisms have resurfaced," thus, placing a premium on the development of a modem military. Hence, the threat that nuclear weapons will be procured by nations previously bereft of such weapons has matured.12
Countries often acquire nuclear weapons in order to accrue prestige and to solve real or perceived security threats. 3 A nation languishing in a long-term affray could radically transform the scope of their confrontation by acquiring nuclear weapons. The procurernnt of nuclear weapons may also be attractive to a nation facing superior conventional forces or suffering from a perceived identity crisis." A likely corollary to a nation acquiring nuclear weapons is for its adversary to do likewise.' 5 9. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Safeguarding the Ingredients for Making Nuclear Weapons, 10 ISSUES SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 67 (Spring 1994).
10. Youngblood, supra note 6, at 337. The desire for a non-nuclear state to obtain such weapons is directly proportional to the regional threat. One example of this regional tension is the case of India and Pakistan. India, seeking to increase its security and international prestige, began developing nuclear weapons and, in 1974, conducted its first nuclear test. Pakistan, feeling threatened by India's nuclear program, began its quest for nuclear weapons. Politicians publicly said that if India had nuclear weapons, the people of Pakistan "would eat grass" until they had nuclear weapons of their own. Id. at 337. This pattern of distrust and one-upsmanship is repeated in the Korean peninsula and the tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Nature teaches us that for small creatures having a very deadly bite is an effective means of survival, consider Israel for example. Id. at 340. 11. In response to the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia declaring independence from the Federation of the Republics of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Serbian led Yugoslavia People's Army invaded Slovenia. The ensuing battles, systematic rape of women, and "ethnic cleansing" demonstrates such hatreds. Since developing nuclear weapons is difficult, a country must either be extremely wealthy or fanatical in order to cultivate their own nuclear weapons. 6 Those nations inept at indigenously developing nuclear technology may resort to the smuggling of nuclear material and the importation of nuclear expertise in order to circumvent existing prohibitions in the marketing of nuclear weapons. With the existing uncertainty in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the concern over the smuggling of fissile weaponry is particularly acute. 7 In fact, R. James Woolsey, former Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has stated that the potential for trafficking nuclear weapons is "fueled by a combination of declining morale among Russian security services and workers at nuclear research and production facilities, and customers such as Iran who are eager to shorten their timetable for development of nuclear weapons."'" perhaps even Egypt would have had strong motivations to move ahead themselves. "BARNABY, supra note 13, at 117. 16 . Plutonium, supra note 15, at 98. 17. As, a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command and control society, a vast potential supermarket of nuclear weapons and fissile material is becoming increasingly accessible. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decay of the custodial system guarding the Soviet nuclear legacy has eliminated this proliferation chokepoint, since states and possibly even sub-state groups can now buy or steal what they previously had to produce on their own. This central fact has transformed the nature of the proliferation problem for ... the rest of the world.
Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials,, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, Federal Document Clearing House Political Transcripts, Aug. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, HILLPR File [hereinafter Nuclear Anarchy] (Graham T. Allison et a], Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University). David Osias, a strategic programs analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency stated: "Our concern about possible loss of weapons-usable nuclear material is increased by our recognition that the Russians may not know either who has all their material or where it is located. The fact that some material has made it out increases the likelihood that other material will also." A Six-Pack of Nuclear Bombs, To Go, C-il. TRIB., Aug. 28, 1995, at 
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In addition to the five declared nuclear powers,' 9 at least a half-dozen nations from the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the Korean Peninsula, as well as some terrorist groups are actively pursuing nuclear weapons capacity, some of whom presumably already possess this technology. 2 Obviously, the random lone terrorist will not be able to fabricate a nuclear weapon. Clearly, many groups of terrorists (or criminals) will lack the technical wherewithal to make nuclear weapons. The point here is not that the entire universe of criminal weapons. The point is that some terrorist groups will likely be able to do so. After all, some groups that employ terror encompass large numbers of people, many of them educated; they are well organized and highly motivated; they can have access to substantial financial resources; and they may have the support of states or groups within states. Given time and fissile material, such a group could be capable of producing a nuclear weapon-especially if it had a little help. ld.
There have been no cases of a rogue state or terrorists using nuclear weapons. The sarin gas attack in Tokyo comes the closest to a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction. This case may have relevance to nuclear terrorism to the extent that the cult had acquired a sophisticated laboratory and developed the capability to manufacture and stockpile a sizable quantity of and engineers. As nuclear capabilities spread, technological constraints on proliferation weaken. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear arms has become far more important than preventing or preparing for direct nuclear conflict. Controlling proliferation will necessitate dealing with technical, institutional, and political difficulties. 2 Moreover, increasing sources of supply undermine international control efforts and exasperate proliferators vulnerability to possible consequences. This note will examine what can be done to curtail the potentially devastating result of fissile material smuggling, holocaust. Part'I will examine the perils of smuggling and how this is aggravated where nuclear weapons are concerned. Part II will investigate the applicable aspects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Part III will examine the International Atomic Agency and demonstrate how it is currently incapable of dealing with smuggling. Part IV will examine the policing mechanisms in place in Europe, i.e., Interpol and Europol, and determine how they may be strengthened to deal with this embryonic disaster. Part V will offer recommendations to curtail the smuggling of fissile material.
Hearings on Nuclear Smuggling in Russia and

II. THE PROBLEMS WITH SMUGGLING IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND RUSSIA
A.
Fissile Material
The smuggling of fissile material from the former Soviet Union is suspicioned by the West as possibly the most intolerable "wave" of organized crime sweeping not only Russia but all of the former Eastern Bloc countries. 2 " The authoritarian mechanisms that formerly safeguarded Soviet nuclear material can no longer be assured; "6 hence, the potential for the smuggling of nuclear commodities exists. For example, attempts to smuggle fissile material into Germany has expanded in recent years.
According to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), a German police agency, attempts have grown from forty-one in 1991, 158 in 1992, 241 in 1993, to 267 in 1994." Many of created an explosion of 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT, which would have demolished an area of about three square miles. Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Dr. Graham Allison). 24. Panofsky, supra note 9.
Giovanni Facchini, Smuggling of Nuclear Material from Eastern Europe Alarms
Experts, DELrrSCHE PRESSE-AGENMrR, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 26. Burrus M. Camahan, Nuclear Smuggling as an International Crime, 28 AKRON L. REV. 417, 418 (1995) . The Soviet safeguarding system relied in large part upon psychology. The Soviets were confident in its control over its people hence any safeguards that were put into place focused on threats from outside of the Soviet Union. Plutonium, supra note 15, at 99. 
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these reported instances have been frauds or have involved material that in no way could be used to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, "since the fall of 1992, there have [only] been five serious cases of diversion of weapons-usable fissile material" the rest have either been hoaxes or have involved material that is not weapons-grade."' Nevertheless, "[t]he fact that a large fraction of the reports of nuclear smuggling have been scams involving material with no relevance to nuclear weapons, should not blind us to the seriousness of the smaller but still significant number of cases that have involved nuclear weapons materials. ' " 9 "The fall of the Iron Curtain and the loosening of internal borders within the (European) Union has resulted in a freer and more deregulated environment, which has created the perfect breeding ground for organized crime syndicates and their illicit activities."" 0 Evidence exists that organized crime syndicates, or an "Atomic Mafia," have attempted to access Russia's 33,000 nuclear warheads 3 1 in order to peddle them for exorbitant sums abroad. 32 The fear of a "Russian 28. Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Cochran). An example of a serious case of smuggling occured in November 1994. There, Czech authorities found six pounds of HEU in the back seat of an automobile parked on a side street. In addition, Russian documents were found with the fissile material. A Czech nuclear scientist, a Russian and a Belarussian were arrested in connection with the seizure. Allison, supra note 17.
29. Id. (testimony of Dr. John Holdren). Even though many of the alleged incidents of smuggling of fissile material turn out to be untrue or unproven or involve anything "remotely 'nuclear'-such as radioactive material used for medicinal purposes--. . . the available facts are grounds for grave concern, for at least five reasons." Allison, supra note 17.
First, the large number of real or fraudulent efforts to sell things nuclear suggests a widespread appreciation within Russia that such material have market value. Second, these facts indicate hat there is considerable effort within Ru&sia to fill the supply side of an emerging, if not formed, nuclear black market. Third, the fact that there is a large number of failed or false attempts to move nuclear materials across international borders is less important than the reality that even a tiny number of successes in transferring nuclear weapons or weapons quantities of fissile material would have very damaging, if not disastrous, consequences. Fourth, it is unlikely that every attempt at nuclear smuggling is detected and reported; by definition, successful transactions on the black markets are covert and unnoticed. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, buried in the large number of claimed cases are a small number of very serious, unchallenged, and unambiguously dangerous incidents. 31. Russia has so many weapons due to the fact that fresh plutonium slowly undergoes radioactive decay, making it unpredictable in warheads. The United States solves this problem by recycling old material, and chemically extracting impurities. As a rule, the Soviet Union did not refresh its plutonium. Aging weapons simply were placed in reserve, replaced by warheads full of fresh plutonium. Plutonium, supra note 15, at 99. Mafia" extends to most countries. 33 The United States Federal Bureau Of Investigation (FBI) is "gravely concerned [that] Russian organized crime nembers may have already obtained, or will obtain, the capacity to steal nuclear weapons." 34 According to various estimates, organized crime controls about seventy to eighty percent of private business in Russia." James Woolsey has claimed that about 5,700 organized crime syndicates operate in Russia, 200 of which have international affiliations. 36 Conservative estimates place Russian stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium at approximately 150 tons and weapons-grade uranium close to 900 tons. 37 Since neither plutonium nor the applicable uranium (U235 which is often referred to as Highly Enriched Uranium or HEU) exists naturally, the primary difficulty in producing nuclear weapons lies in obtaining sufficient quantities of the refined material. 38 The sheer volume of weapons grade material engenders the possibility that some material will escape the current control mechanisms." Only a fraction of these huge stocks in the wrong hands would create havoc. 4 " After efforts to cover up accidents and due to the lax security at its nuclear arsenals,"' some Russian experts have reluctantly admitted that some superfluous nuclear warheads may not be adequately secured. 42 Due to the disarmament treaties between the United States and the former Soviet Union, roughly six tons of plutonium and thirty tons of HEU are due to be released annually over the next thirteen years. 43 As weapons are gradually dismantled, the separated plutonium and uranium are either stockpiled or processed 4 4 by Minatom, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and principle nuclear custodian.' The U.S. and Russia are engaged in a cooperative effort to control and account for fissile material in order to help ameliorate the logistical quandary of fissile material dismantlement." 6 Minatom and a private U.S. corporation, the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, have an agreement whereby Enrichment Corporation purchases nuclear material from Minatom which has been reprocessed into a commercially viable product. Enrichment Corporation 40. A crude atom bomb requires a mere 15 kg of this uranium or five kg of the plutonium, about the size of a grapefruit. Panofsky, supra note 9. Thomas Cochran, the director of the Natural Resources Defense Council, sought to impress this point during a Capital Hill briefing. He had a six pack of Coca Cola cans filled with 15 pounds of uranium. The uranium was not weapons usable. If the fifteen pounds (or 6.8 kilograms) were plutonium it would have represented more plutonium than was used on Nagasaki during World War II.
A country like the United States or Russia with very sophisticated capabilities could make small nuclear weapons with [close to] three to five kilograms of [HEU] or [approximately] one kilogram of plutonium. And if you start doubling that amount, you can do the same thing with greater ease, with less sophistication in the design. Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Cochran). According to Dr. Cochran's estimates, a Middle Eastern country could take the material that has been smuggled to date and produce a low-yield nuclear weapon using technology used in the United States and Russia in the 1950's. 1d; see also Global View, supra note 11. 41. Larry Thomson, Yeltsin's Nuclear Report Reveals Problems, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 7, 199.5, at A3, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 5493568.
42. Plutonium, supra note 15, at 98. Alexei Lebedev of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry openly states that there is no firm assurance that nuclear weapons have been stored in secured locations. Bettina Vestring, German Police Smuggled Radioactive Material, REUTERs, September 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
In Russia, growing concern about the security at nuclear installations has prompted the formation of a special battalion of troops to combat possible nuclear terrorism and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Andrei Ivanov, [Vol. 6:1 SMUGGLING OF FISSILE MATERIAL then peddles the material to civilian entities. 4 The U.S. has offered Russia up to $30 million to help account for the fissile material not yet dismantled and improve the security of the weapons. 48 The U.S. hopes to install temporary safeguards with the goal of establishing a more permanent and protective system patterned after the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 4 9 Under that system fissile material is counted to within four-tenths of a gram, a stringent technical control regime costing the U.S. about $700 million a year to operate.'
The CIS and Russia have been consistent in their denial that any nuclear material has escaped their territories. 5 Russian officials charge that the reports of smuggling of fissile material is a Western ploy aimed at gaining control over Russian nuclear weapons. 5 2 They claim that such campaigns have been launched to prevent the presence of CIS enriched uranium, isotopes, and heat-releasing elements in the world market. 53 Alexander Mikhailov, an official of the Russian Federal Counter-Espionage Service (FSK), asserts that, "[a]ttempts to blame Russia for being unable to control the non-proliferation of its nuclear weapons, technologies and materials are politically-motivated" ' and that the "accusations of Russian laxity [are] part of a campaign to prepare public opinion 'for the idea of implementing political control over Russian nuclear weapons.""' Germany, for instance, is believed to have attempted to dramatize the situation with hopes of obtaining full disclosure of all nuclear inventories. 5 6 In fact, some believe that many of these incidents have been prompted by German officials 57 by their 47 offering of huge payments in sting operations." 8 Regardless of Germany's motives or Russia's claims, concern that fissile material may eventually find its way into the wrong hands is legitimate. In fact, the Ukraine has previously suspended the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia due to the "political instability and confusion" that has existed within the Russian Federation. 9 The Ukraine's concern was that the missiles being returned to Russia were not being destroyed, but actually falling into unfriendly hands. 6 This concern may be credible considering additional reports from Kazakhstan stating the possibility that the republic has had three or four weapons disappear. 6 '
The absence of centralized control in Russia hinders the fight against smuggling. A paradigm of this acute problem exists in Central Asia. There, smuggling has been developed over the centuries into a highly skilled craft to the extent that even when the Soviet army and KGB controlled the border areas, local communities conducted trade with non-Soviet states. 62 In fact, smuggling via Armenia or Afghanistan has become a highly successful enterprise with little chance of detection. 63 This skill in smuggling coupled with the Muslim brotherhood of southern border republics and the nearby states that crave nuclear technology, i.e., Iran and Iraq, could conceivably lead to the border republics aligning themselves with their fellow Muslims rather than the rest of the CIS and Russia 6 If such alliances do coalesce, the proliferation of former Soviet fissile materials stationed in the republics to punitive states is plausible.
B.
Nuclear Expertise
In the former Soviet Union, as many as 100,000 scientists, engineers and technicians developed and cultivated the largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. 65 Two to three thousand scientists were involved in plutonium production and uranium enrichment activities-two of the most sensitive areas in nuclear shipped 12.8 ounces of weapons-grade plutonium to Moscow and back so it could be seized on its arrival. Spolar, supra note 51.
58. Arthur Allen, Spy Scandal in Germany, DAYTON have been shut down while production at several major nuclear facilities has terminated. 7 Due to the acrimonious fiscal realities existing in the former Soviet Union, despondent scientists emigrating to punitive states as nuclear mercenaries is a grave concern. 6 This "brain drain' extends beyond nuclear mercenarie, inclusive in the problem are those scientists seeking legitimate employment outside the former Soviet Union." Unsophisticated in the world arena, a scientist believing she is being employed on a civilian nuclear power project may inadvertently supply general information and expertise useful for weapons development. In fact, Iraq set up front companies in Western Europe in order to recruit unsuspecting Commonwealth scientists who would not otherwise consider laboring for rogue states like Iran, Iraq, or Libya 7
The concern over the smuggling of fissile material and expertise has merit regardless of whether Russian scientists are insulted by these accusations. 
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Russian nuclear scientists are no more amoral than their Western counterparts and are similarly horrified of nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, many Russian scientists, formerly unfamiliar with fiscal anxieties, now must survive on meager gratuities. 74 Incentives offered by a few nations are sufficient to convince even the most idealistic scientist to stray from the path of nonproliferation when confronted with fiscal ruin."
In an attempt to ameliorate the harsh economic situation for the once high level physicists and engineers, Russia has implemented a conversion program," 6 while the European Community, the United States, and Japan have pledged to fund two nuclear research centers in the CIS." The Russian program is an attempt to convert many of the weapons producing industries into other enterprises such as automobiles or electronics. Unfortunately, the program has not been overly successful, as many of the former elite scientists are now relegated to designing "new kinds of iceboxes and ... baby buggies .... ."" With these menial vocations, most salaries have deteriorated. 9 That some of these scientists may become discouraged at the lack of use of their extensive expertise and training is self-evident.
The joint plan by the European Union, United States, Japan and the Russian Federation has also been developed in an effort to help Russian military experts channel their talents towards peaceful scientific and industrial activities." 0 The International Science and Technology Centre's (ISTC) objective is to "give Russian and other CIS weapons scientists and engineers opportunities to redirect position-is an expression of distrust, if not a direct insult, to that community. Are we really to consider a nuclear bomb maker in the same category as a paid assassin? The predicament does not necessarily concentrate within the Russian military establishment, where there is yet to be one confirmed incident from missing material, but with civilian controls. 8 4 Laboratory results taken of samples from previous recdveries confirm this, indicating that the fissile material originates from spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines and material for medical purposes produced by research reactors. 8 5 Consequently, the initial preventive measures should concentrate on the civilian sector. As the counting of bombs gives rise to the accounting for the material, i.e., dismantlement, the chances that material will disappear during this process are particularly acute.
III. THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TREATY
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)1 6 is one of the most farreaching legal instruments currently in place to combat the spread of nuclear weapons materials and expertise. 7 For a quarter of a century, the NPT has been the "touchstone of all international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons."" With over 170 parties, it is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement in history. The NPT is concerned with stemming the demand for nuclear weapons. "[It] addresses horizontal proliferation by requiring non-nuclear states to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards in order to receive the benefits of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." 9 "It also addresses vertical proliferation, requiring the nuclear states to pursue in good faith complete nuclear disarmament."'" Pursuit of these goals is premised on the fact that the vast majority of nations do not possess nuclear weapons technology and that indigenous development of such technology would be extremely difficult. 92 Asymmetrical in nature, the NPT's participants have considerably divergent rights and obligations. 93 The five nuclear weapons states 4 agree not to export those items necessary for the development of nuclear weapons." In return, those non-nuclear weapon countries are allowed to import items necessary for the production of peaceful nuclear power, subject to enforcement by the IAEA.9 s Articles I and II of the NPT set forth the basic duties of the signatory states. Article I dictates:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 97 Article II requires that:
Each non-nuclear weapons State Party to the treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek to receive any assistance in the "The benefits of the nuclear power technology coupled with the international respect of membership, make the NPT hard to resist for a country desiring nuclear power." 9 9
The difficulty inherent in producing nuclear weapons is germane to proliferation control. Each signator to the NPT must "agree to be bound by [the treaty's] terms in order to receive the technology needed to support a successful nuclear power program."'° Since an essential purpose of the NPT is to assist, or even encourage, the development of nuclear energy capabilities while severely restricting access to nuclear weapons technology,'' the NPT encourages the dissemination of technology which could indirectly increase a state's capacity to produce nuclear bombs." 0 2
In ratifying the NPT, the non-nuclear weapon states pledged not to secure, manufacture, or otherwise acquire a nuclear arsenal. They also committed themselves to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 0 3 regarding all fissionable material used in peaceful nuclear activities within their territory or jurisdiction. 0 4 The non-proliferation commitment of the NPT and the acceptance of comprehensive safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities attempted to address the political and security concerns of nuclear proliferation.'°I n order to prevent diversion of fissile material to non-nuclear weapons states, fissile material must be accounted for. 0 6 Article III of the NPT requires each signatory nation to negotiate safeguard covenants' 0 7 with the IAEA overseeing all of their peaceful nuclear activities. 0 8 The safeguards that the nonnuclear states must accept are not specifically addressed by the NPT itself, rather each country must individually work out the safeguard details with the IAEA.' 0 9 Even though the NPT does not require that safeguards be applied to nuclear activities in the nuclear weapon states," I 0 all five have volunteered to place their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards."' The safeguards are supposed to timely detect "diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons." ' 2 Safeguards also engender confidence in the nature of each state's nuclear activity and expedite international cooperation in the development of nuclear energy." 3 For material existing within a country, the safeguarding procedure comprises three basic factors: (1) cataloging every transfer into or out of fissile material storage facilities such that the IAEA and the state are informed at all times of the quantity, locality, and movement of nuclear commodities;" (2) installation of containment and surveillance devices at the fissile storage facilities;" and (3) human observation of the facilities." 6 Unfortunately, these safeguards apply to declared nuclear material and not to the transfer or receipt of undeclared nuclear weapons or devices. Nor are the safeguards intended to verify that a state is not making preparations for developing a nuclear explosive device.'17
The enforcement mechanisms available to stop the supply of nuclear expertise, ranging from the efforts of Russia to stop the unlawful emigration of its scientists to the role of the international community in deterring and prosecuting these scientists, differ from the mechanisms used to stop the demand for nuclear weapons. Article I of the NPT fails to address the problem of nuclearexpertise proliferation. The fact that Russian nationals are lending aid to another state's nuclear weapons program is probably not a technical violation of the NPT because there is no state action involved (i.e., Russia"' is not assisting, encouraging, or inducing any action because it is not sending its scientist abroad). Rather, these scientists are voluntarily leaving Russia against the interests and desires of the Russian government. Under the NPT, the Russian government is not compelled to prohibit its people from emigrating. "Prior to the discovery of the Iraqi and Northern Korean nuclear programs no material breaches of the NPT had been recorded." ' 9 Subsequently, however, the insufficiencies of the treaty have become prominent. Parties to the treaty observe the provisions as they see fit, they could conceivably claim acquiescence to the NPT yet covertly seek to distribute fissile material. Iraq proclaimed obeisance to the NPT prior to the Gulf War, North Korea overtly refuses to comply with mandatory inspections. Meanwhile, states outside the NPT like Israel, a nuclear weapons nation,' and in the past South Africa,' 2 ' refuse to enter the treaty while other non-nuclear states remain legally unobstructed in their pursuit of nuclear activities.' 22 Even though Article H explicitly outlaws solicitation efforts by non-nuclear countries, "z' the treaty's safeguards are too weak to enforce its mandates, especially in the face of intense demand for nuclear expertise.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
After World War II, the initial United States response to the apocalyptic hazards of atomic weaponry was to enact the Atomic Energy Act. 2 This act Dec. 22, 1991, at A12. The problem is that under the NPT there were only five countries authorized to maintain nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union was one of these. Accordingly the U.S. argued that Russia should continue to not only occupy both the former Soviet Union's General Assembly and Security Council Seats but also the other republics must apply for membership into the United Nations as new states. One of the arguments for this was that Russia is clearly the dominant part of the former Soviet Union and this falls in line with eleven of the former Soviet republics that Russia be given the USSR Security Council seat. Id. at 264-265.
119. Keliman, supra note 3, at 801. 120. Israel is believed to have as many as 100 nuclear weapons. 
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attempted to contain the spread of nuclear technologies via secrecy and denial. The act prohibited "any person .. . to (A) possess or transfer any fissionable material .... or (B) export from or import into the United States any fissionable material, or (C) directly or indirectly engage in the production of any fissionable material outside of the United States."'" The effectiveness of this act quickly dissipated as countries successfully tested their atomic weapons.'" On December 8, 1953, to ameliorate the ineffective Act President Dwight D. Eisenhower proffered, what was latter termed, the "Atoms for Peace" plan to the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly. 27 He proposed setting up an Atomic Energy Agency under the aegis of the U.N. which would be responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of contributed fissionable materials.'
In addition, the "responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind."' 9 Eisenhower believed that "[i]t is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace."' 30 Finally, in order for this proposal to be effective, Eisenhower requested that involved governments contribute portions of their fissionable material stockpiles to the Agency.'
This Atoms for Peace proposal effectively rejected earlier and more encyclopedic strategies, acknowledging that comprehensive international control over nuclear weaponry would be formidable. By proposing such a plan, Eisenhower wished to strengthen and amplify American military and economic ties around the world, assure American primacy in international nuclear councils, advance American power reactor sales, yet concomitantly promote disarmament. 32 As a result, on July 29, 1957, the U.N. established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 133 to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."' 34 The IAEA was 125. Atomic Energy Act, supra note 124, § 5(a)(3 [Vol. 6:1 authorized to "establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control [were] not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."' 35 In addition, the IAEA was empowered:
To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors ... hav[ing] access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded... and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose.
136
Since 1970, IAEA responsibilities result primarily from non-nuclear weapon states joining the NPT and obligating themselves to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.' 37 Unfortunately, the safeguards are neither intended to seek out clandestine operations nor undeclared activities, nor govern or regulate national action. Their function is to monitor, audit and report in order to verify that states are in compliance with their voluntary undertakings. 3 ' IAEA members do not have to submit to safeguards unless the member has sought and received assistance in some peaceful nuclear activity from the agency. In fact, nuclear safety is ultimately a national responsibility, and only the state has the authority to legislate and enforce. 139 Consequently, some fissile material activity will go undetected.
The IAEA abandoned the idea of monopolizing fissile material in favor of a system of international verification of nationally owned and controlled nuclear activities by member states.'
In recognizing that the logistics of a fissile material monopoly were problematic, the U.N. has adopted a system of voluntary compliance. By volunteering to conform with the NPT, each state subjects itself to verification that its international nuclear commitments are not breached. Preventing the unauthorized accumulation of fissionable material is believed to be more successful if the material is discovered during the early stages of weapons fabrication rather than in the later stages (such as an actual bomb).' 41 The IAEA's effectiveness has been restrained due to its limited datagathering operations. Often the Agency must solicit intelligence about a 135. Id. at Art. m1, A.5 
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particular country's nuclear activities from outside intelligence agencies. 142 Fol example, Hans Friedrich Meyer, a spokesperson for the IAEA, claims that unti the agency has independent confirmation from some reputable institution, it musi remain aloof of reports that Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan have visited Dushanbe, the capital of Kazakhstan, and shopped for nuclear technology.1 4 The IAEA acknowledges the inhering risks associated with its present restrictions; consequently, the agency has requested greater autonomy in monitoring potential trafficking in nuclear materials.'" IAEA experts state that the risk of smuggling and leakage depends on the reliability of the CIS's system of accounting for its nuclear weapons. This system is weakest when weapons are being transported.' 45 To effectively ameliorate the deficiencies in the current CIS monitoring systems, the IAEA should be given control over the entire nuclear cycle, from the mining of uranium and the production of deuterium and tritium to the handling of waste; however, the feasibility of this type of monitoring system may be fiscally unreasonable.
4 6
In addition to expanding the powers of the IAEA, the fiscal quandary must be overcome. The present finite financial budget of the agency effectively renders meaningful inspection impossible. 147 As a result, the agency rarely exercises its full power of inspection; hence, much has slipped through the Agency's fingers. The Iraqi's clandestine buildup of nuclear technology amplifies this dilemma. Prior to the Gulf War, the agency's inspections dis-covered no illegitimate nuclear activities; the Iraqi nuclear technology was allegedly for peaceful use only.' In fact, Iraq had been a member of the NPT and the IAEA for the previous ten years during which they took an active role in fostering nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation.' 4 Prior to its invasion of Kuwait, many experts believed that, Iraq was five to ten years away from developing a viable nuclear arsenal. 50 As subsequent events demonstrated, the time frame, and scale of Iraqi nuclear activity was grossly underestimated. This Iraqi nuclear deception emphasizes the inadequacies of both the NPT and the IAEA. In an attempt to mitigate fears of nuclear proliferation, the IAEA claims that would-be nuclear powers would have great difficulty servicing a plutoniumbased weapon. 5 ' Plutonium-based warheads are relatively insatiable, thus requiring careful maintenance and having a short shelf-life compared to other conventional weapons. Maurizio Zifferero of the IAEA said that plutonium 241 isotope, which accompanies plutonium 239, decays and causes contamination that would require the warhead to be regularly cleaned by a large and steady flow of plutonium. 152 A single warhead with the minimum amount of plutonium, about five kilograms, has a shelf-life of between one and two years during which it must be carefully serviced. If the plutonium was not pure but only 80 percent enriched, then perhaps twice as much plutonium would be necessary for servicing. If the state wished to ensure a nuclear threat, a steady flow of the material would be necessary to help with the sophisticated reprocessing requirements.' 53 Consequently, nuclear powers like the United States and Britain regularly rotate the warheads in order to ensure their serviceability." 4 Due to the inherent difficulties in developing a plutonium based weapon, "it does not make a great deal of sense to be buying plutonium unless you have had a previous program, and even then it would be easier to use a uranium-based weapon, which you can machine and weaponise in the open."' 5 5 Countries like Iraq that have spent considerable money and expertise on a simpler uranium-based weapons system have had enormous trouble servicing this syster.' 56 Presently, international supervision over the world's estimated supply of 1,000 tons of plutonium and 1,500 tons of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is woefully limited.'" Approximately 95% of the HEU inventories are controlled by the United States and Russian armed forces. Only 1% of the world's HEU is under the safeguards administered by the IAEA. Plutonium, meanwhile, is mostly under the auspices of civilian control, falling under international safeguards.'
Due to the recent concern over the smuggling of fissile material, there has been an outcry for the strengthening of the IAEA. Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany have asked that the Agency's duties be expanded to become an intelligence clearing house in the fight against smugglers. '-9 In an effort to facilitate this purpose, the above four countries have pledged to provide 151. Peter Beaumont, Germany: Only Big Boys Need Apply-Plutonium, OBSERVER 
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up to 6.4 million dollars." 6° Additionally, IAEA directors have proposed setting up an international database to track plutonium smugglers, and the U. S. National Security Council has promised to pay for this database.' 6 ' The IAEA also is considering how to "set up a series of international missions-similar to its established nuclear safety inspectorates--to inspect plutonium-handling facilities and to provide expertise and hardware." 162 Nevertheless, the IAEA is the appropriate agency to monitor the disposition of CIS nuclear technology and its possible transferal to third world powers. As most of these countries are signatories of the NPT, it is within the jurisdiction of the IAEA to inspect all nuclear technology in the possession of these countries to determine whether it is being used for peaceful purposes. In theory, the IAEA has the right to review all documents and records, send inspectors into safeguarded states, have access at all times and places, as necessary, to account for the materials, and determine whether their country is in compliance with the NPT. 6 3 In practice, however, this is not always the case.
V. POLICING MECHANISMS IN PLACE
Policemen depend upon the powers conferred by the state to perform many of their criminal investigative functions, yet the internationalization of their investigations thrusts them beyond the jurisdiction of their sovereign, where they are effectively stripped of their police powers. The result is that most international law enforcement activities must depend upon the cooperation of foreign authorities.'
A. Interpol
The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 165 was formed in 1923. Although World War II briefly interrupted its existence, Interpol has continued to prosper and now has over 140 member countries. 66 A nation's reliance on Interpol tends to be in proportion to the extent the nation must cope with international crime and the quality of its law enforcement division's relationship with its foreign counterparts. In contrast, in many less developed states, police agencies rely on Interpol out of necessity. 69 In developed areas, such as Western Europe, bilateral relations among the national police agencies are well-developed. ' Many of these law enforcement agencies are frustrated with Interpol due to its failure to adapt to changing circumstances and to quickly integrate new technological advances in crime control and communications.' 7 ' Despite the steady rise in international police cooperation, there is not a single international convention which governs or regulates interstate cooperation among police agencies.1 7 1 Interpol has limited jurisdiction and authority in the areas of international law enforcement since it usually operates on a voluntary basis in agreements between domestic police agencies. The rise in drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism has resulted in a higher interaction between Interpol and national police agencies. 113 Unfortunately such cooperation has been relegated to bilateral and informal arrangements which do not have the status of treaties.
B. Europol
In Maastricht, Netherlands in December of 1991 the Treaty on the European Union 174 was signed by the twelve members of the European Community (EC).17s The treaty's underlying purpose is to enable the EC "to play a more coherent political and economic role in the world, commensurate with its international responsibilities."' 7 6 This treaty, wider in scope than any previous EC treaty, consists of three pillars. The Third or Judicial and Internal Affairs Pillar covers a substantial range of issues including the creation of a unionwide police information exchange system, Europol.177 The European Council 7 agreed to create Europol in order to organize the exchange of information between the EC police and customs agencies 79 in the fight against drugs within the EC's twelve member states. 80 The proliferation of fissile material must be promptly addressed. With the increasingly frequent reports of nuclear smuggling, eventually enough nuclear material will wind up in the possession of terrorists or religious fanatics. "Although the cases of smuggling plutonium discovered to date in Germany and Eastern Europe have involved relatively small quantities of fissile materials, the capture of this material should provide only a modicum of reassurance-the smugglers who have been apprehended may be the clumsiest or most careless, or those most likely to fall for sting operations run by police and journalists." ' 90 Russia lacks sufficient funds and political stability to properly deal with its nuclear weapons, hence the EC along with the U.S. must lend financial assistance in order to set up proper control mechanisms. The present conversion program, an attempt to convert many of the weapons producing industries into other enterprises, must continue to receive EC and U.S. support.
A. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
A comprehensive ban 9 ' on testing nuclear weapons will not preclude the In addition, France and Great Britain are in a significantly different position than the United States and Russia in regards to nuclear weapons. 9 Both European countries have a more modest arsenal and much smaller quantities of fissile material than the United States and Russia.' 96 ' They must therefore see to the preservation of other basic interests."' 97 Countries free from potential regional conflicts are less likely to be concerned with maintaining a nuclear arsenal.' However, countries with real or perceived threats to their security will insist on testing their nuclear arsenal. For example, French President Jacques "In the meantime, in the mid 1960's, after the first five states had already tested and deployed nuclear weapons, negotiations on" the NPT were well underway. With article six of the NPT, each of the parties is called upon '"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ... under effective international control."' "The preamble of the treaty and the negotiating record make it abundantly clear that a comprehensive test ban was widely considered to be an essential part of the" process of nuclear disarmament. A CTBT had in effect become a "part of the promise the states that had nuclear weapons made to the states that did not have them in order to persuade them to forever forego the acquisition of such weapons for themselves." Consequently, many feel that fulfillment of the promise by the five nuclear weapon powers to enter into a CTBT is overdue. Herbert F. 
B. Domestic Legislation
Assisting another state or group to develop nuclear weapons must be criminalized through domestic legislation, 2 "° strong disincentives must be developed in order to prevent scientists from becoming nuclear mercenaries. The CIA believes the potential emigration of former Soviet scientists to aid rogue states in their development of nuclear weapons to be the most obdurate nuclear proliferation problem.°1 To curtail this problem, the U.S. Congress found it within the "national security interest of the United States ... to facilitate, on a priority basis . . . the prevention or diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise of the former Soviet Union to terrorist groups or third countries." 2 '
Russia and the CIS must enact and enforce similar legislation. Restraints must be sufficient so as to effectively offer adequate incentives to the scientist to remain at home; the econornic hardship in Russia must be eased. The U.S. State Department recognizes the financial quagmire of nuclear physicists and has offered to provide funds to help those scientists work in peaceful applications of their knowledge and expertise. 0 ' This would deter many scientists from becoming involved in the development of other nations' nuclear capacities.
C. NPT
The NPT should be amended to discourage nuclear-expertise proliferation. The idea that Russian nationals technically may lend aid to another state's nuclear weapons program is a reprehensible oversight. The insertion of laws prohibiting "citizens of one country from participating in another state's nuclear weapon program ' '2°4 or citizen participation laws into the NPT could help curtail the 199. Musil, supra note 192. Frances nuclear weapons arsenal has not been effective in emigration of nuclear mercenaries. s Amxnding such clauses into the NPT would not only be precedentially sound but unabashedly moral. Poignant to prosperity of this proposal is the inclusion of a proviso granting jurisdiction to all stateparties over any illegal expertise proliferation, regardless of where the actions occur. "For example, if a proliferating scientist is arrested while vacationing in Barbados, [it] could litigate and penalize the proliferator pursuant to the NPT' s grant of jurisdictional authority." 2°I n addition, "[t]he pledge of the nuclear weapon states in Article VI of the [NPT] to pursue comprehensive disarmament negotiations in good faith can hardly be said to have been fulfilled." 2 7 France and China have tested nuclear weapons irrespective of their good faith requirements under Article VI of the NPT. 2 D 8 In April 1995, at the NPT extension conference, "France and the other nuclear states won the uneasy support of the non-nuclear states not to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. ''2° In return, France promised to "eventually eliminate their own stockpiles." '° France's decision to test nuclear weapons after their pledge demonstrates the weaknesses of the NPT and its enforcement mechanisms. The only realistic methods to influence France to abide by its pledge would be non-legal, political measures such as embargoes on French products. 21 ' 205. Id. For a more indepth discussion of the effectiveness of "citizen participation laws" see Adam Treiger, Note, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing Nuclear Expertise Proliferation, 82 GEO L. J. 237. There, the author discusses the effectiveness of "citizen participation laws" in respect to nuclear experts vending their skills abroad.
Such laws have been enacted in previous treaties effectively limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For example, the Biological Weapons Convention Treaty contains such a clause in article IV which reads:
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery. 
D. IAEA
For the IAEA to become more effective its budget must be increased. 21 Russia, the CIS, and EC member states should be encouraged to increase their voluntary contributions. Next, the Agency must take a proactive role in monitoring nuclear weapons at the source as well as in possible destination countries. Whether these weapons are being prepared for dismantlement, shipped from one former republic to another, stored or left in place, every weapon must be accounted for. In light of the fact that tactical weapons are extremely small in size, great in number, and spread throughout military bases in the former Soviet Union, accounting for them becomes extremely important." 2 3
E. Consolidation
To help ameliorate the tremendous logistical difficulties presented to the IAEA by the sheer volume of fissile material located in the former Soviet Union, Russia should be strongly encouraged to consolidate its holdings into a few well secured facilities. Currently, more than a hundred such facilities exist in Russia. With the lack of sufficient control mechanisms in place in Russian and other CIS states, it has been estimated that a few hundred million dollars would be needed to bring the existing facilities housing fissile material to a "tolerable level of protection." 2 "" If there were not over a hundred such facilities but rather twentyfive facilities with protections greater than "tolerable" the IAEA would be better able to maintain inspections of the facilities and Russia would have to expend less.
E. Europol
The EC should proceed with its implementation of Europol. Interpol is limited in its effectiveness due to its world-wide jurisdiction, and is not equipped to handle the magnitude of criminal activity that permeates the EC. Europol, however, as an embryonic entity is capable of focusing on arresting the spread of fissile material smuggling before it develops into a profitable enterprise for criminal and terrorist organizations. The EC should have Europol work in conjunction with the IAEA in monitoring clandestine nuclear activities of its member states. Europol's assistance would indirectly benefit the EC and allow the IAEA to focus its efforts in the volatile former Soviet Union.
212. The CIS has been derelict in its payments to the IAEA; in 1991 it reneged in its payment of $20 million.
213. See generally Allison, supra note 17; Carnahan, supra note 26; Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Dr. Cochran).
214. Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Dr. Holdren).
1995]
IND. INT'L & COMP. L REV.
Timely detection and enforcement would effectively restrict the proliferation of fissile material and expertise. The IAEA, EC, and the former Soviet Union must coordinate efforts to arrest the development of this horrific potentiality. Nuclear weapons are presently sparse among rogue states. The involved parties should attempt to maintain this status since no nation is immune to the effects of a nuclear holocaust. The destructive powers of the original atom bomb should not be disparaged, they should be revered. Indeed, the smuggling of fissile material is an embryonic phenomena with a terrifying future. [Vol. 6:1I
